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In ‘Essential stuff’ (2008) and ‘Stuff’ (2009), Kristie Miller argues 
that two generally accepted theses, often formulated as follows, are 
incompatible: 
- (Temporal) mereological essentialism for stuff (or matter), the thesis 
that any portion of stuff has the same parts at every time it exists. 
- Stuff composition, the thesis that for any two portions of stuff, there 
exists a portion of stuff that is their mereological sum (or fusion). 
She does this by considering competing hypotheses about stuff, trying 
to prove inconsistency in all cases and with all corresponding 
understandings of mereological essentialism and stuff composition. 







In recent work (2008, 2009), Kristie Miller considers two theses, which are often 
characterized in the following manner: 
- (Temporal) mereological essentialism for stuff (or matter), the thesis that any 
portion of stuff has the same parts at every time it exists.2 
- Stuff composition, the thesis that for any two portions of stuff, there exists a 
portion of stuff that is their mereological sum (or fusion). 
She argues that these two generally accepted principles3 are incompatible, and 
that, given the plausibility of stuff composition, we should conclude that 
mereological essentialism for stuff is false. She does this by considering 
competing hypotheses about stuff. She attempts to establish incompatibility in all 
possible cases, in particular whether one is a perdurantist or an endurantist. Her 
argument is also meant to apply independently of one’s preferred semantics for 
mass nouns (e.g. a semantics based on mereology or plural reference) and one’s 
corresponding understandings and formulations of mereological essentialism and 
stuff composition. 
The details of Miller’s demonstration vary with the alternative conceptions of 
stuff she considers. But at heart, the basic set-up of her argument remains the 
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same. In what follows, I reply from the standpoint of an endurantist about material 
objects and stuff. Endurance corresponds to an ordinary view of material objects, 
objects that exist during a certain period. Under this view, a material object like a 
chair exists for a while, being “wholly present” at any time at which it exists; it 
has spatial parts, but no temporal parts. The same is true of any portion of stuff, 
like some wood: it exists for a while, being wholly present; it has spatial parts, but 
no temporal parts. 
In the first section of this note, I present Miller’s argument, then show that it is 
based on a questionable assumption, left unmotivated by Miller. In the second 
section, I show that our use of mass nouns denoting stuff does provide evidence in 
favor of this assumption if one adopts a semantics of mass terms based upon 
mereology. I then explain how a recent account of mass expressions (cf. Nicolas 
2008) allows an endurantist to maintain mereological essentialism as a thesis 
about an entity and its parts, while understanding stuff composition as a thesis 




Miller’s argument can be explained with the following example, which is similar 
to the one she uses (the world W3 described on page 59)4, but simpler in that it 
doesn’t presuppose that stuff is composed of mereological atoms.5 Consider three 
succeeding moments of time, t1, t2, and t3. Some stuff x (which may be some 
wine, if one wants a concrete example) exists from t1 until t2, being destroyed 
at t2. Some stuff y (which may also be some wine) exists from t1 to t3, having no 
part in common with x. The principle of stuff composition entails that there exists 
some stuff z that is the mereological sum of x and y.6 “x and y are parts of z 
simpliciter”, says Miller (page 59), “and so in a sense, the parts of z do not 
change.” But “this tenseless sense in which [z] does not lose parts is not the sense 
we mean to employ when we say that portions of stuff” always have the same 
parts. Rather, we mean that the parts some stuff has at some time (parts that exist 
at that time) are identical to the parts it has at any other time at which it exists. 
And under this sense, Miller continues, z has different parts at different times. The 
parts it has at t1 are those of x and y and mereological sums thereof. While at t3, its 
parts are only those of y, since x doesn’t exist anymore. Hence, mereological 
essentialism is false. 
A first difficulty for Miller’s analysis is this. Miller supposes that the 
mereological sum of x and y exists from t1 to t3. Yet, from an endurantist 
perspective, material entities fall under properties and relations in an inherently 
time-relative manner. Thus, a banana may be green at t and yellow at a later 
time t’. But there is no sense in which the banana would be green and yellow 
simpliciter. Similarly for parthood: it is taken to be a three-place relation between 
a material entity, a part, and a time. As explained by Hawley (2001: 25) and 
Olson (2005: 5), the rejection of atemporal talk about parthood and other 
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mereological notions is a typical feature of endurance theory.7 Under such a 
conception, the mereological sum of two material entities exists only when both 
entities exist. In particular z, the sum of x and y, exists when and only when both 
x and y exist. That is, it exists from t1 until t2. At t3, x doesn’t exist anymore, so 
neither does z. But then, at any time at which it exists, z has the same parts (those 
of x and y and mereological sums thereof). Hence, z provides no counterexample 
to mereological essentialism for stuff. 
Let us look at the problem from a slightly different angle. What intuitions are 
responsible for the belief in mereological essentialism for stuff and the belief in 
stuff composition? Concerning the former, as Miller writes (page 62), 
“the intuition is that if we remove some water from a portion of water, [what 
remains] is not the same portion of water.” Concerning the latter, the intuition 
may be expressed in the following way.8 Imagine that some water x is on your left 
and some water y on your right. Then, when you consider x and y together, you 
still have some water, indeed, what seems to be a larger portion of water that you 
can describe as the water on your left and on your right. According to a popular 
view about mass nouns and stuff, this may be characterized as the mereological 
sum of x and y. These two intuitions seem to apply for stuff of any given kind: 
they appear to be satisfied not only by water, but also by wine, gold, sand, etc. So 
we arrive at two principles. The first is that if you remove some stuff from a 
portion of stuff, what remains isn’t the same portion of stuff. And generalizing 
this a bit further, we obtain mereological essentialism: if at some time t, x exists 
and has certain parts (parts that exist at t), then at any other time t’ at which x also 
exists, the parts x has at t’ (parts that exist at t’) are the same than the parts x has 
at t. The second principle corresponds to a quite common understanding of stuff 
composition: at any given time, if there exists some stuff x and some distinct 
stuff y, then x and y together form a larger portion of stuff, z, which can be 
characterized as their mereological sum. These two principles do not enter in 
conflict with each other. Inconsistency arises only when stuff composition is 
understood as somehow operating across time. Why should we think that stuff 
satisfies this kind of cross-temporal composition principle? 
 
Section 2 
Miller does not say why. So this key part of her argument is left unmotivated. Yet, 
as I will now show, language does allow us to refer to stuff that doesn’t exist at 
the same time. Here is an example. Imagine that every month, John created some 
stuff (it may be some wine, or some water if John is a chemist), which was 
destroyed later in the same month. Knowing this, we can refer to the stuff John 
created in March, x, and to the stuff John created in April, y. And we can also 
refer to x and y as the stuff John created in March and in April, even if x and y do 
not exist at the same time. Under the popular conception of mass terms as 
denoting mereological sums, this definite description would then be taken to refer 
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to the mereological sum of x and y, since only this would ensure that mass terms 
have a uniform semantics, while treating various definite mass expressions in 
different ways would be ad hoc. So under that conception, the way we refer using 
mass nouns would constitute evidence in favor of mereological sums of things 
that do not exist at the same time and in favor of the cross-temporal principle of 
composition put forward by Miller. 
 However, the mereological view is not the only one. Under an alternative 
conception, mass nouns function semantically like plural terms: they can refer to 
several (enduring) things at once. Then the definite description the stuff John 
created in March and in April just refers to two entities, x and y, which do not 
exist at the same time. There is nothing surprising in this: using plural 
expressions, we can talk of Caesar and Napoleon even if they existed at different 
periods. This seems more plausible than holding that something is the 
mereological sum of Caesar and Napoleon. Similarly for mass nouns if they 
function like plural terms: the expression the stuff John created in March and 
in April then refers to two entities, x and y, that do not exist at the same time. 
There is no need to postulate that x and y would have a mereological sum. Indeed, 
under that conception, the thesis of stuff composition (which was previously 
understood as asserting the existence of the sum of any two portions of stuff) is 
reformulated as a thesis about how mass nouns refer. Let M be a mass noun, 
like water or stuff. Whenever you can say of an entity x that it is some M and of a 
distinct entity y that it is some M, you can also refer to x and y together as 
some M; doing so, you’re just referring to two things, not one. 
Miller quickly considers this kind of view on page 61. Following van Inwagen 
(1990) and Zimmerman (1995, section 9), she assumes atomism: a portion of stuff 
is a plurality of atoms (or simples), so that This stuff is part of that stuff just means 
that the atoms making up this stuff are among the atoms making up that stuff. So 
according to her, mereological essentialism should be replaced by a different, 
though analogous, principle. This principle says that if some stuff is made at t of 
some things xs (“a plurality of things”) and at t’ of some things ys, then the xs and 
the ys are identical. Now, it is plain that this principle does not apply to all the 
stuff we can refer to: for the stuff John created in March and in April is made in 
March of things that are different from the things it is made of in April. In other 
words, the principle is not satisfied by “cross-temporal pluralities.” 
But if one is not atomist, then an independent notion of mereological part is 
needed, corresponding to the commonplace fact that a material entity may have 
parts. Consider the water in a bottle and the water in the lower half of the bottle. 
The latter is part of the former, just as the leg of a table is part of the table. So we 
need a relation of part applying in both cases. When atomism is not assumed, this 
relation cannot be reduced to the among relation between pluralities. Thus, 
Nicolas (2008) puts forward a semantics of mass nouns that uses both plural 
reference (explaining the intuition behind stuff composition  by saying that a mass 
expression may refer to several things at once) and a notion of mereological part 
(to account for the fact that a material entity like the water in a bottle or a table 
may have parts). With such a notion of part, the basic intuition behind 
mereological essentialism can be expressed as follows, for any mass noun M. 
Suppose that at time t, an entity x is some M and y is part of x. If we remove y 
from x, what remains is not the same M (it is not identical to x). Generalizing, we 
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arrive at mereological essentialism. Suppose an entity x is some M that exists at t 
and at t’. Then the parts x has at t (parts that exist at t) are identical to the parts x 
has at t’ (parts that exist at t’). This principle only concerns an entity and its parts. 
Now, when we talk of the stuff John created in March and in April, we are 
referring to (at least) two entities, the stuff John created in March, and the stuff he 
created in April. The principle of mereological essentialism, as just stated, does 
not apply to these entities referred to together. So it has nothing to say about the 
stuff John created in March and in April. And more generally, it does not enter in 
conflict with stuff composition, properly understood as the claim that a mass noun 
may be used to refer to several things at once. 
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